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Abstract 
India, with its 20 million shareholders, is one of the largest emerging markets in 
terms  of  the  market  capitalization.  In  order  to  protect  the  large  investor  base,  the 
Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has enforced a regulation effective from 
April 2001, requiring mandatory disclosure of information and a change in the corporate 
governance mechanisms of the listed companies. This study empirically examines the 
economic  impact  of  the  Regulation  on  the  stock  market  variables.  The  experimental 
group exhibits significant reduction in their beta consistent to the notion that increased 
information  and  better  corporate  governance  mechanism  reduces  the  risk  of  these 
companies.  
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Berle and Means (1932) in their seminal book pointed out that in the modern 
corporation there is separation of ownership from control. The divergence of interest 
between owners and the managers caused due to this separation leads to the agency costs. 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the agency costs are the sum of bonding costs, 
monitoring  costs  and  residual  loss.  The  literature  on  corporate  governance  provides 
analyses  of  various  mechanisms  to  reduce  those  costs.  The  information  asymmetry 
between the owners and mangers due to the separation of ownership from control is a 
vital  source  of  the  agency  costs.  Healy  and  Palepu  (2000)  in  a  review  of  empirical 
disclosure  literature  concisely  put  forth  the  solutions  to  reduce  this  information 
asymmetry. They argue that optimal contracts between the managers and shareholders, 
financial disclosure regulation and information intermediaries are a few of the possible 
solutions to reduce the information asymmetry. 
Transparency in corporate financial reporting enhances discipline in management, 
facilitates appropriate valuation of the company, and reduces the opportunity for a few to 
benefit by using sensitive information not available to the capital market. Appropriate 
valuation of companies in the capital market exposes under-performing companies to the 
risk of takeover. The fear of losing control acts as a stimulus to perform at the optimum 
level from owners’ perspective. The quality of corporate financial reports is an essential 
determinant of the quality of corporate governance. Moreover, transparency in corporate   3 
financial report is essential to enforce accountability of executive management to the 
board of directors and accountability of the board of directors to shareholders. Therefore, 
regulators  protect  the  right  of  the  capital  market  to  receive  timely  and  complete 
information necessary to evaluate the performance and financial position of the company 
and  to  forecast  its  ability  to  generate  adequate  cash  flows  in  future  (Bhattacharyya 
(2003)).  Thus,  one  of  the  objectives  of  any  disclosure  regulation  is  to  increase  the 
transparency and accountability by providing timely and ‘true and fair’ information to the 
stakeholders.  
To write and to enforce a comprehensive contract covering all the contingencies 
that might occur in the future is either impossible or very costly. Therefore, the option of 
optimal  contract  between  managers  and  shareholders  to  reduce  the  information 
asymmetry is by and large infructuous. The information intermediaries as proposed by 
Healy  and  Palepu  (2000)  also  have  a  limited  role  in  Indian  financial  markets.  In 
developed  countries,  for  example,  in  the  United  States,  many  cases  of  fraud  and 
misrepresentation are being reported against the companies, the intermediaries and the 
auditors; and the number of such cases against which/whom the SEC took action (civil 
injunctive actions and other proceedings) during the financial year ended 2003 is 679 and 
the corresponding figures for financial year ended 2002 is 599.  Even in the developed 
financial  markets  the  informational  intermediaries  are  not  able  to  unearth  all  the 
malfunctioning/ fraud/ misstatement of the companies. Therefore, it is inappropriate to 
expect them to play a significant monitoring role in emerging markets like India. Given 
this situation, the best option available to the Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI) 
to reduce the information asymmetry is to regulate the financial disclosures being made 
by  the  companies.  Based  on  the  recommendations  of  the  Kumaramangalam  Birla   4 
Committee,  SEBI  formulated  and  implemented  the  regulation  (Code)  on  corporate 
governance. This regulation is applicable to companies listed in Indian stock exchange in 
a phased manner, the details of which are given in section 3 of this paper. The Code 
sought to bring about changes in the governance structures and transparency in corporate 
reporting. The objective of the ‘SEBI regulation on corporate governance’ is to protect 
non-controlling shareholders from expropriation of wealth by managers and appropriate 
valuation of companies in the capital market. The Code focuses on the board structure, 
the  process  of  board  meetings  and  disclosure  of  relevant  information  to  the  capital 
market.  
Given the limited voluntary disclosure prior to the regulation and the absence of 
the information intermediation, it is expected that the increase in accountability of the 
managers and the board to shareholders; and the transparency in corporate reporting will 
enhance the capital market efficiency and hence will increase the investors’ confidence. 
The  main  objective  of  this  empirical  study  is  to  analyze  the  impact  of  the  ‘SEBI 
regulation  on  corporate  governance’  on  the  stock  markets  and  comment  upon  the 
effectiveness or otherwise of the said regulation. We evaluate the effectiveness of the 
regulation by examining the changes in the risks and returns of the stocks. We measure 
risk in terms of beta and standard deviation.  For the purpose of this study, the beta, 
standard deviation and returns in the pre-regulation time period (1
st June 1998 to 31
st May 
1999) is compared with the same in the post-regulation time period (1
st June 2001 to 31
st 
May 2002).  
Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature, both theoretical and empirical, 
on  the  financial  disclosure  regulation.  The  objective  of  this  study  is  to  examine  the 
regulatory  effects,  and  so  we  restrict  the  literature  survey  to  the  financial  disclosure   5 
regulation.  Section 3 examines the disclosure policies in India, both prior to and after the 
SEBI  regulation.  There  has  not  been  much  emphasis  on  the  corporate  governance 
mechanisms  in  India,  prior  to  this  regulation.  The  Department  of  Company  Affairs 
(DCA) approved a Code of corporate governance in the year 1997 which however, was 
not mandatory.  This section aids us in understanding the dismal state of an ordinary 
investor, prior to the regulation, due to the lack of relevant information required for her 
decision-making. The change initiated by SEBI in the corporate governance structure and 
the financial disclosure practices is elaborated in the same section.  
The hypothesis and the models used in the study are discussed in Section 4.  In 
the same section, we give a schematic representation of the expected impact of the ‘SEBI 
regulation on corporate governance’.  We argue that the regulation will have an impact 
on  the  risk,  returns,  volume  of  trading  and  the  bid-ask  spread.  However,  due  to  the 
unavailability of the data, the bid-ask spread could not be used for the purpose of this 
study. From Table.10 and Table.11 we find that the daily average number of transactions 
for a sample of 100 companies has steadily increased from the year 1999 and the total 
number of trades on the National Stock Exchange has also more than doubled during the 
same period. And it is difficult to isolate the effects of the regulation on the volume 
traded; we do not consider the impact of regulation on the volume traded in this study. 
Hence, the study is restricted to finding the impact of regulation on the risk and returns of 
the companies.  
Section  5  discusses  the  methodology  adopted  to  examine  the  hypotheses  and 
presents results. Section 6 presents the conclusions and directions for future research. 
 
   6 
2. Literature review 
 
Most  research  papers  on  disclosure  of  accounting  information  use  data  from  the 
United States capital markets and information provided by the United States companies. 
The  research  by  Benston  (1973)  on  the  economic  impact  of  the  Securities  Exchange 
Commission Act, 1934 has fostered inter-disciplinary research in the field of regulation, 
accounting and finance. The research in this area has been extended to find the impact of 
the  segment  reporting  on  the  stock  market  variables.  Apart  from  these  two  well 
researched regulations, considerable work has been done on other regulations concerning 
the  banks  (Hagerman  (1975))  and  the  oil  industry  (Lev  (1979)).  There  is,  however, 
limited research in this area in the context of emerging markets including India; this study 
will be the first of its kind in the Indian stock markets.   
Regulations provide certain benefits and also entail certain cost. Regulations involve 
three types of costs: 
(i)  Cost to companies of meeting regulatory requirements 
(ii)  Cost of maintaining and implementing the regulation 
(iii)   Cost of improper/incorrect regulation 
Regulation is justified only if the benefits to the society exceed the sum of those costs. 
More particularly the costs to the companies include the information collection costs, 
processing costs and dissemination costs (Merton (1987)). Higher disclosure may also 
result in proprietary costs to the companies and investors. The benefits to companies 
include reduction in risk, increase in the liquidity of stock due to the decrease in the 
information  asymmetry  and  easy  access  to  capital  markets;  this  in  turn  increases  the 
valuation of the companies.  Investors have the benefit of liquidity.  These benefits of   7 
liquidity of the markets will lead to enhanced efficiency in the stock  markets over a 
longer period.  
The economic impact of any regulation can be assessed by studying the reaction 
of  the  stock  market  variables  during  the  post-regulation  time  period.  Apart  from  the 
economic  impact,  a  regulation  also  has  a  social  impact.  Subsequent  to  a  disclosure 
regulation, the investors have a greater set of liquid securities to choose from and to make 
appropriate portfolio decisions. This in turn increases the expected utility of the investors, 
thereby increasing the social welfare of the investors. Hakkansson (1980) argues that it is 
difficult to find welfare effect from the changes in security prices. Increase in security 
prices  does  not  mean  increase  in  welfare  and  vice-versa.  It  is,  therefore,  difficult  to 
quantify expected utility and analyze the social impact of a regulation, and hence we 
restrict our analysis to the economic consequences of the Regulation. 
 
2.1. Theory: Impact of disclosure regulation on the stock market 
 
Lev (1988) argues in favour of increased disclosure of financial information of 
firms. Inequity in capital markets, defined here as inequity of opportunity or the existence 
of systematic and significant information asymmetries across investors, which leads to 
adverse  private  and  social  consequences:  high  transaction  costs,  thin  markets,  lower 
liquidity  of  securities,  and  in  general,  decreased  gains  from  trade.  Such  adverse 
consequences of inequity can be mitigated by a public policy mandating the disclosure of 
financial information in order to reduce information asymmetries (Lev , 1988). Gonedes 
and Dupoch (1974) assert that any change in accounting techniques used for external 
reporting shall have an impact on the capital market equilibrium in either of the following   8 
three ways; (1) the change leads to the provision of accounting numbers that convey 
information pertinent to valuing a firm; (2) the change per se has a substantive economic 
impact  independent  of  the  accounting  numbers  affected  by  the  change  in  reporting 
techniques; or (3) the change per se signals other events that have economic importance.  
Increase in information flow to stock markets will have an impact on number of 
stock market variables. Commitment of the firm to increased levels of disclosure should 
reduce the information risk and consequently the information asymmetry component of 
cost of capital (Leuz and Verrecchia , 2000). In literature, bid-ask spread is used as the 
proxy for information asymmetry. More timely and relevant disclosure should reduce this 
spread. The other effects of reduction in the information asymmetry are increase in the 
trading volume of the shares. Trading occurs  when there is no  consensus among the 
investors  (Beaver,  1968)  and  when  there  is  flow  of  new  information  to  the  market 
participants. In Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) model, increase in liquidity is a concave 
function of the level of precision in information. This implies that trading increases in a 
proportion more than the reduction in the information asymmetry. Information will have 
an  impact  on  the  portfolio  decisions  of  the  investors,  who  will  trade  based  on  this 
information and this in turn will affect the equilibrium prices of the stocks (Brailsford, 
1996). Tauchen and Pitts (1983) model establishes volume and price changes as being 
joint (random) function of the information flow.  
Investors,  after  analyzing  the  reported  information,  alter  their  expectations 
regarding  future  firm  performance;  this  behaviour  should  be  reflected  in  the  unusual 
security prices and return changes (Horwitz and Kolondy, 1977). The reduction in the 
information asymmetry will reduce the cost of capital in the long run and hence increase 
the valuation of the companies. This effect can be captured by analyzing the changes in   9 
the returns earned by the stocks after there has been increase in the disclosure levels. It 
has  also  been  argued  that  new  information  disclosure  will  lead  to  reduction  in  the 
speculative positions and hence reduction in the risk (Diamond, 1985). Beta might also 
be affected if the data disclosed in the financial statements provide information about the 
risk class of a company and the relationship of its economic value to changes in the 
economy (Benston, 1973). Beta and Standard deviation of the stock returns have been 
used by researchers as a surrogate for risk. 
Consequently any regulation requiring more and timely information disclosure 
might have an impact on the risk, returns, volume and the spread of the stocks.  
 
2.2. Empirical evidence: Impact of disclosure regulation on the stock market  
 
Broadly the research in this area has been concentrated on 2 important regulations 
i.e, the SEC Act, 1934 and the Segment Disclosures, 1970. Of late the researchers are 
investigating  the  effects  of  other  regulations  too.  This  section  reviews  the  empirical 
studies on these regulations.  
 
2.2.1. SEC Act, 1934 
Stigler and Benston are the first researchers to study the impact of a disclosure 
regulation on the stock market variables. Stigler (1964) studies the impact of the SEC 
Act, 1934, on the volatility of the returns of new issues of securities. For the purpose of 
his study he uses the data for years 1923-1928 as pre- SEC regulation period and 1949-
1955  as  post-SEC  regulation  period.  His  results  prove  that  during  the  post-SEC 
regulation  period,  the  volatility  of  the  returns  of  new  issues  has  been  reduced,   10 
consequently leading to a reduction in the returns itself. Jarrell (1981) with improved 
statistical techniques finds the same result as Stigler (1964).  Friend and Herman (1964) 
believe that lower volatility during the post-SEC has attracted more risk-averse investors 
and has encouraged higher levels of investment in the United States capital markets.  
Conversely, Benston (1973) did not find any impact of the SEC Act, 1934 neither 
on the abnormal returns of the security nor on the variability of the security returns of the 
experimental  group  of  companies  during  the  post-regulation  period.  In  this  case  the 
experimental group consists of companies for which the SEC Act is applicable for the 
first time since 1934. His basic premise is that regulation in order to be effective should 
reduce the relative riskiness of the companies measured by its equity beta. Due to lack of 
evidence in support of his hypothesis, he argues that the SEC Act 1934 is not beneficial 
to  the  investors  either  in  terms  of  improving  the  returns  to  them  or  reducing  their 
variability. Friend and Westerfield (1975) counter the results obtained by Benston (1973) 
by demonstrating that the result is due to wrong classification of the firms.  
 
2.2.2. Segment Disclosures, 1970 
Segment  reporting  has  been  made  mandatory  by  the  Securities  Exchange 
Commission for the companies listed on the stock exchanges in United States from the 
year 1970. Much research has been done to find the impact of this regulation on the 
capital markets.  
Collins  (1975)  constructed  two  portfolios,  one  with  greater  segmented 
information and the other with limited segmented information. He finds that the portfolio 
with companies disclosing greater segment information earned abnormal returns greater 
than  the  group  with  less  segmental  information.    Dhaliwal  (1977)  finds  that  the   11 
experimental group, consisting of companies reporting the segment data for the first time, 
experienced a lower standard deviation of its returns after the regulation has become 
effective. However, Horwitz and Kolodny (1977) find that there is neither any reduction 
in risk nor any significant impact on the abnormal returns subsequent to the segment 
reporting regulation. However, Collins and Simonds (1978) argue that the shortcomings 
in  their  sample  selection  and  the  hypothesis-testing  procedures  may  have  led  to  this 
result. With more robust techniques and appropriate time period Collins and Simonds 
(1978)  conclude  that  the  beta  of  multi-segment  treatment  group,  consisting  of  firms 
having  more  than  one  segment  and  disclosing  such  segment  information  after  the 
regulation was effective, has in fact been lower during the post-regulation period. They 
find no difference in the beta from pre- regulation to post-regulation of other two control 
groups. Foster and Vickery (1978) find that the abnormal returns during post-regulation 
period is more than the non-reporting period; proving the effectiveness of the regulation.  
Swaminathan (1991) argues that the regulation in order to be effective should 
increase the price variability since reduction of information asymmetry will attract more 
investors to the capital market and this in turn will increase the price variability. Similarly 
he argues that due to segmental data the differences in the forecasts by various analysts 
should reduce. He finds affirmative results. However, for the purpose of our study we 
argue that reduction in information asymmetry will reduce the volatility. Greenstien and 
Sami  (1994)  look  at  the  impact  of  the  regulation  on  bid-ask  spread,  a  surrogate  for 
information asymmetry. They find that the bid-ask spread of the experimental group has 
experienced a lower abrupt shift during the post-regulation time period.  
 
2.2.3. Other Regulations   12 
Hagerman  (1975)  uses  a  stable  symmetric  distribution  method  to  find  if  the 
government regulation on banks in the United States, requiring state banks to disclose 
additional information has accomplished its goal. He proves that the annual report does 
contain information on which the investors act upon. Lev (1979) finds the impact of the 
exposure draft by FASB in July 1977 requiring the oil and natural gas companies to shift 
from full cost (carry forward the expenses on exploration of oil and gas reserves as a 
capital item and write it off over a period of time) to successful efforts (expensing all the 
costs in current year irrespective of the amount of reserves identified). He finds that the 
full cost firms required to shift to successful effort method of accounting experienced a 
significant reduction in their abnormal returns. The number of firms, belonging to Full 
cost group that experienced a reduction in abnormal returns is greater than the number of 
companies  belonging  to  successful  efforts.  Jain  (1983)  with  improved  statistical 
techniques confirms the results obtained by Lev (1979).  Hagerman and Healy (2000) 
find that the regulation in 1994, requiring the OTC companies to disclose according to 
the SEC Act, 1934, is not effective in reducing bid-ask spread. However, Bushee and 
Leuz,  (2003)  find  that  the  OTCBB  regulation  imposing  additional  disclosure 
requirements for OTC companies in 1999 is effective in increasing the liquidity of the 
experimental  firms.    Leuz  and  Verrecchia  (2000)  in  their  research  on  German  firms 
adopting international accounting standards find that the bid-ask spread has reduced and 
the liquidity has increased for the firms adopting the international accounting standards. 
In their research they prove that reporting based on International accounting standards 
has better information content.  
Majority of the research studies mentioned above have been conducted on the 
United States capital markets and hence our study enables us to understand the impact of   13 
disclosure  regulation  on  the  financial  markets  of  India,  one  of  the  biggest  emerging 
markets. Table.1. below gives us a summary of the empirical research done till date in the 
area of financial disclosure regulation. Before formulating our hypothesis we need to 
understand  the  disclosure  practices  in  India  prior to  the SEBI  regulation  has  become 
effective.  
 
3. Financial Disclosure and Corporate Governance in India 
 
Prior  to  the  1990’s  the  financial  disclosure  in  India  was  minuscule.  The 
companies during this period were owned by large successful business  groups. Their 
important source of funds was from their own group companies and from Development 
Financial Institutions. Very few companies raised their funds from the stock market and 
there was no motivation to make even the minimal required financial disclosures to the 
general investors. Till the early 1990’s the Controller of Capital Issues (CCI) was held 
responsible for the efficient functioning of stock markets. However, with adoption of 
economic restructuring the CCI was taken over by the Securities and Exchange Board of 
India, SEBI which was formed in 1992 to protect investors’ interest.  
Consequent  to  its  formation  the  SEBI  has  put  in  place  many  regulations  to 
regulate  different  categories  of  players,  like  the  Merchant  Bankers,  Brokers,  and 
Institutional Investors, in capital markets. It has also passed regulations dealing with the 
takeover code, investor grievances etc. Inspite of the efforts taken by the SEBI there was 
not much improvement on the accounting disclosure practices until the late 1990’s. Till 
then  the  disclosure  requirement  was  regulated  by  the  Companies  Act,  1956;  the   14 
Accounting Standards formulated by the  ICAI
3 and the listing agreement. The listing 
agreement is applicable only to the listed companies and the other non-listed companies 
are not required to disclose these information. The amount of disclosure to be made by 
registered companies in India is thus, very limited. However, the globalization, the East-
Asian  crisis  and  the  stock  market  crashes  have  forced  the  regulator  to  rethink  the 
corporate governance issues including the financial disclosures being made by the Indian 
companies.  SEBI  constituted  a  committee  under  the  Chairmanship  of  Shri 
Kumaramangalam  Birla,  to  suggest  improvements  in  the  corporate  governance 
mechanisms  and  other  related  aspects.  The  regulation  on  corporate  governance  is 
implemented by way of amendment to the listing agreement. This SEBI regulation has 
changed the entire nature of governance and the disclosure being made by the Indian 
listed companies.  
 
3.1. Disclosure Prior to the ‘SEBI regulation on corporate governance’  
 
The  Companies  Act,  1956  requires  registered  companies  in  India  to  disclose 
certain minimum information in prescribed format to investors and regulators. Apart from 
this, the listing agreement with the Stock exchanges requires the listed  companies to 
provide certain relevant and timely information to the investors. The financial statements 
of all the registered companies should also comply with the accounting standards laid 
down by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI), the apex body regulating 
the accounting standards in India, from time to time. The disclosure requirement under 
each of the above three is enumerated below. 
                                                 
3 The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India   15 
 
3.1.1. Companies Act, 1956 
Section 210 of the Companies Act requires every company to prepare its balance 
sheet and profit & loss account in accordance with Part I and Part II of the Schedule VI of 
the Act. This section also specifies that ‘notes’ to the broad items of the balance sheet and 
profit & loss account should be provided as part of the annual reports. This section is 
however not applicable to the companies which have a specific format for reporting its 
balance  sheet  and  profit  &  loss  account.  Banks,  insurance  companies  and  electricity 
companies are examples of companies which are exempted from this Section.  
Section 212 requires holding companies to present a copy of the balance sheet, 
profit & loss account, board’s report, auditor’s report of the subsidiary company as part 
of its annual report.  
Section 216 requires companies to include auditors report including any special or 
supplementary report as part of the annual report. 
According  to  Section  217,  the  annual  report  should  contain  board  report  as 
annexure which shall contain the information about the state of company affairs, dividend 
declared, amount the company intends to transfer to the reserves etc.  
 
3.1.2. Listing Agreement 
  Listed companies should provide the Cash flow statement, prepared according 
to Accounting Standard 3 issued by ICAI, as part of their annual reports. It should 
also provide, the distribution of shareholding of the companies, un-audited results of 
the company as a whole and segment-wise on a quarterly basis to the stock exchanges 
and advertise the same in the local newspapers. Atleast 7 days in advance of the   16 
board of directors meeting, the companies should communicate to the stock exchange 
any  recommendation,  to  be  made  by  the  board,  of  dividend  or  rights  issue  or 
convertible debentures etc.   
 
3.1.3. Accounting Standards  
Till date the ICAI has issued 29 Accounting Standards. Every pubic company 
should prepare its accounts in confirmatory with the Accounting Standards. Broadly these 
Accounting  Standards  provide  guidelines,  most  of  which  is  mandatory  to  the  listed 
companies, for measurement and disclosure of various profit and loss, and balance sheet 
items. Of late, the emphasis has been on fair value disclosures through the Accounting 
Standard  28  which  deals  with  impairment  of  assets.  Overall  the  Indian  Accounting 
Standards are being benchmarked against the International Accounting Standards and the 
US GAAP. During the last few years, many Indian companies have accessed foreign 
capital markets and therefore disclosure practices of those companies match international 
standards.  
 
3.1.4. Voluntary disclosure 
The voluntary disclosure literature is limited in India. Singhvi (1967) finds that 
the quality of information provided by the Indian companies is far lower than that of US 
companies. Marston (1986) finds similar result, when he compares disclosure by Indian 
companies  with  that  by  UK  companies.  For  the  financial  year  ending  1995,  Infosys 
technology iss the only company to voluntarily disclose financial statements prepared 
under US GAAP. The main reason for such voluntary disclosure by the Company is the 
increase in its revenues from the United States and its objective to raise funds, in the near   17 
future, from the US stock markets (Narayanaswamy (2001)). The results obtained by 
Krishnamurti (2003) show that the companies belonging to emerging markets have lower 
disclosure  levels  and  lower  accounting  standards  when  compared  to  the  developed 
countries, due to which they have to comply with more stringent norms of the SEC while 
listing for their ADR’s. Patel et al (2002) compose a transparency and disclosure score 
for the companies belonging to the emerging markets. During 1998, the disclosure levels 
for  Indian  companies,  in  terms  of  the  disclosure  score,  were  low  as  compared  to 
companies belonging to other emerging markets. However, the disclosure score for the 
Indian companies across all industries has considerably increased for the financial year 
ended 2000.   
The requirement for voluntary disclosure is high in those countries where there is 
high  dependence  on  the  capital  markets  to  raise  the  funds.  However  in  India,  the 
dependence of the companies on capital markets for funds is limited. Family business 
groups  control  majority  of  the  companies  and  the  role  played  by  the  financial 
intermediaries  is  particularly  limited  in  India.  Khanna  and  Palepu  (2000)  find  that 
diversified Indian business groups add value to the group companies by replicating the 
role  played  by  intermediaries.  The  finding  of  Khanna  and  Palepu  (2000)  can  be 
exemplified by looking at the figures 3 - 7, where the proportions of the internal sources 
as part of the total sources, and the proportion of retained earnings as part of total sources 
are  given. We find that for the financial  year  ending 2004 the proportion of internal 
sources as part of total sources is 59.4%, 38.8% and 61.8 % for the companies belonging 
to the Indian business group, other private non-business group and the foreign private 
companies, respectively. The corresponding figures for the financial year ending 1991 is 
33.4%, 37.9% and 38.3% respectively. The percentages are based on all the companies   18 
whose  data  is  available  in  the  Economic  Intelligence  Service,  Centre  for  Monitoring 
Indian Economy Pvt. Ltd. The figures indicate that there has been increasing dependence 
of the private sector companies, especially the business group companies, on the internal 
resources for their fund requirements. Given this situation we can expect that the need of 
the companies to voluntarily disclose information over and above that is required by law 
is low. 
Healy  and  Palepu  (2001)  argue  that  there  are  6  hypotheses  for  voluntary 
disclosure  being  made  by  any  company  i.e.,  capital  market  hypothesis,  market  for 
corporate  control  hypothesis,  managerial  compensation  hypothesis,  litigation  cost 
hypothesis,  management  talent  signaling  hypothesis  and  proprietary  cost  hypothesis. 
However, most hypotheses favoring voluntary disclosures do not hold good in the Indian 
context. Till recently the capital market was neither wide nor deep, the corporate control 
market was almost absent, implementation of regulations was weak, and proprietary cost 
is not high due to lack of competition in the product market. Therefore, we can argue that 
the voluntary disclosures by companies have been limited till the late 1990’s. The SEBI 
regulation on the corporate governance ensured investors would atleast get certain vital 
information about the future prospects of the company and the environment in which it is 
operating. The question of whether the disclosure should be left to the companies or 
whether the government should regulate it is a separate research question, which is not 
being considered in our study.  
 
3.2. Changes in the disclosure regime and corporate governance practices in the 
recent past 
   19 
From the previous sections, it is clear that the mandatory disclosures to be made 
by  a  public  limited  company  under  the  various  statutes  are  minimal  as  compared  to 
disclosures required in the advanced countries. It was only in 1999 that SEBI formed a 
committee  under  the  Chairmanship  of  Shri.  Kumaramangalam  Birla,  to  strengthen 
investor  protection  and  increase  the  information  availability  to  the  investors.  The 
Kumaramangalam Birla Committee came up with a proposal of mandatory disclosure of 
‘Corporate Governance Report’ and Management Discussion and Analysis (MDA) in the 
annual  reports  of  listed  companies.  Apart  from  this,  the  Committee  made  several 
mandatory  recommendations  in  order  to  enhance  the  governance  mechanisms  of  the 
Indian companies. The objectives of the Regulation are: 
•  Shareholder  value  maximization  by  reduction  in  information 
asymmetry.  Increase in the availability of information about the 
expected future performance of the company which will in turn 
help the investors to make appropriate investment decisions based 
on their risk taking capabilities.  
•  To ensure an appropriate board and leadership structure so that the 
managerial risk faced by the shareholders is reduced. 
•  To enhance the credibility of information being provided by the 
board  and  the  management  by  ensuring  that  the  public  limited 
companies  have  an  appropriate  board  structure  and  leadership 
structure. 
The  main  objective  of  SEBI  regulation  is  shareholder  value  maximization  by 
putting corporate governance structures in place and through the reduction of information 
asymmetry between the managers and the investors of the company. Jensen (2000) also   20 
argues in favour of shareholder wealth maximization as the main objective function of 
any company.  
The applicability of recommendations to the companies is as follows: 
￿  By  all  entities  seeking  listing  for  the  first  time,  at  the  time  of 
listing. 
￿  Within financial year 2000-2001,but not later than March 31, 2001 
by all entities, which are included either in Group ‘A’of the BSE or 
in S&P CNX Nifty index as on January 1, 2000. 
￿  Within financial year 2001-2002, but not later than March 31, 2002 
by all the entities which are presently listed, with paid up share 
capital of Rs. 10 crore and above, or net worth of Rs 25 crore or 
more any time in the history of the company. 
￿  Within financial year 2002-2003, but not later than March 31, 2003 
by all the entities which are presently listed, with paid up share 
capital of Rs 3 crore and above. 
The committee came up with certain recommendations on corporate governance 
and other matters to strengthen the monitoring of managers and reduce the information 
asymmetry between the managers and shareholders. It made certain mandatory and non-
mandatory  recommendations  for  the  companies  registered  in  India  in  line  with  the 
Cadbury report. The recommendations of the Committee are given as below.  
  
The mandatory recommendations of the committee are 
•  The board of the directors shall consist of atleast 50% of non-executive 
directors. And if the chairman is an executive director then atleast half of   21 
the board of directors shall be independent and in other case atleast one-
third of the total directors shall be independent. 
•  The audit committee should have atleast three non-executive directors out 
of which majority should be independent. The chairman of the committee 
should be an independent director. It should have atleast one director with 
finance and accounting background. 
•  The  board  of  directors  shall  determine  the  remuneration  of  the  non-
executive directors. 
•  The corporate governance report in the annual report shall comprise of 
information  regarding  the  components  of  remuneration  paid  to  its 
directors. 
•  The  directors  shall  not  be  members  of  more  than  10  committees  or 
chairman of more than 5 committees across all companies. 
•  In case of appointment/reappointment of directors, shareholders should be 
provided a resume, information regarding functional expertise and number 
of directorships held in other companies. 
•  Quarterly results should be placed on the companies’ web site.  
•  A Shareholders grievance redressal committee should be formed under the 
chairmanship of a non-executive director. 
•  Every  Annual  report  of  a  listed  company  shall  consist  of  compliance 
report on Corporate Governance.  
•  The companies should provide Management, Discussion and Analysis as 
part of their annual report.  
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The non-mandatory recommendations are: 
•  Non-executive  chairman  can  maintain  a  chairman’s  office  at  the 
company’s expense. 
•  The  remuneration  committee  should  have  atleast  three  directors  all  of 
whom  shall  be  non-executive.  The  chairman  should  be  an  independent 
director.  
•  Half-yearly financial results should be sent to each shareholder. 
 
The Committee emphasized on the independence of the board so as to ensure 
effective  monitoring  of  the  management  by  the  board  of  directors.  A  right  mix  of 
executive  and  non-executive  directors  will  enable  the  board  to  take  the  appropriate 
strategic decisions at right times. The requirement to have an audit committee with non-
executive directors strengthens the monitoring role of the board by ensuring that there is 
no manipulation of the accounts and misuse of the funds by the management. This report 
also  emphasizes  the  related  party  transactions,  so  that  there  is  transparency  in  the 
transactions between the company and the related parties. A related party in this case is 
defined as a promoter, his relative, the management, and any other person / institution 
who / which may have potential conflict with the interests of the company at large.    
The disclosure required to be made in the Corporate Governance Report and the 
Management  Discussion  &  Analysis  report  will  reduce  the  information  asymmetry 
between the managers and that of current and potential investors. The recommendations 
of the Committee were applicable by way of amendment to the listing agreement. The 
contents to be disclosed in the ‘Corporate Governance Report’ as per Clause 49 of the 
listing agreement are as follows   23 
￿  Information about the board of directors and the management: This 
includes the qualifications, composition of the board of directors etc.  
￿  Remuneration to the directors of the company: Total remuneration, the 
performance-linked remuneration and stock options to the directors of 
the company should be clearly stated. 
￿  Shareholding  pattern:  This  sub-clause  gives  information  about  the 
percentage  of  shares  held  by  promoters,  foreign  shareholders, 
Government Financial institutions and the general public.  
￿  Committees  formed  by  the  Company:  Information  about  the 
composition of committees like the Audit committee, Remuneration 
committee should be provided in this sub-clause.  
Some of the most critical financial/operational information lies within the scope of 
Management,  Discussion  and  Analysis  (Vaidyanath  (2003)).  The  MDA  should 
contain discussion on the following matters within the limits set by the company’s 
competitive position:  
￿  Industry structure and developments 
￿  Opportunities and Threats 
￿  Segment–wise or product-wise performance 
￿  Outlook  
￿  Risks and concerns 
￿  Internal control systems and their adequacy 
￿  Discussion  on  financial  performance  with  respect  to 
operational performance   24 
￿  Material  developments  in  Human  Resources  /  Industrial 
Relations front, including number of people employed.  
The MDA provides the information about the competition within the industry, the 
changes in the government policies and industry climate and its impact on performance. 
It also gives information about segment wise risk and returns, risks which are unique to 
the positioning of a company and the steps taken by the company to mitigate such risks.  
The East-Asian crisis and the increasing globalization have forced the regulator to 
put appropriate regulations in the capital market to attract foreign capital. This regulation 
is aimed at putting appropriate governance structures in place, which will take care of the 
informational needs of the shareholders. The Kumaramangalam Birla Committee expects 
that the good governance and timely disclosure of information to the shareholders will 
maximize their wealth.  It remains to be seen if the regulation has indeed maximized the 
shareholders wealth. Though the report has been discussed in full length before it has 
been implemented, this discussion might have impacted all the stocks in the same way. 
Our main purpose is to find how the additional information being disclosed consequent 
upon the regulation being effective, has influenced the stock market variables of such 
companies’.  
 
4. Hypothesis development and model building 
 
We can expect that if the ‘SEBI regulation on corporate governance’ is followed 
not just in letter but also in spirit then the valuation of such companies should increase. 
Thus  we  expect  that the  regulation  will  have  an  impact  on  the  beta,  returns,  bid-ask 
spread and the volume of shares traded of the companies that have complied with the   25 
regulation. Figure 1 gives us a fair view on what could be the impact of the regulation on 
the stock market variables. Due to the lack of availability of the bid-ask spread data for 
the relevant time period, we could not study the impact of regulation on the spread of 
such  companies.  As  mentioned  earlier,  we  shall  not  be  studying  the  impact  of  the 
regulation on the volume.  
Hongren (1957) and Choi (1973) argue that increased disclosure will reduce the 
cost  of  equity.  New  information  disclosure  will  lead  to  reduction  in  the  speculative 
positions and hence reduction in the risk (Diamond, 1985). Similarly Botoson (1997), 
Botoson and Plumlee (2002) argue that increased disclosure is associated with lower cost 
of  equity.  We  conjecture  that  good  governance  will  increase  timely  and  appropriate 
information  dissemination,  which  in  turn  will  reduce  the  information  risk  to  the 
shareholders. The reduction in the information risk will lead to a reduced spread which in 
turn will increase the net gains to investors thereby reducing their cost of capital and thus 
increasing the valuation of such companies. The increased information and congenial 
governance systems will enable investors to correctly assess the different states of nature 
and thus correctly value the shares.  
On the basis of the above argument we can expect that the regulation requiring 
additional disclosure and good governance system will reduce the risk of investment in 
companies to which the regulation is applicable. For the purpose of our study, risk is 
measured  by  beta  and  standard  deviation  of  the  stock  returns.  Beta  measures  the 
systematic  risk  of  stocks.  On  the  assumption  that  the  investors  hold  a  diversified 
portfolio, the beta is the important determinant of the cost of equity. We expect that the 
increased disclosure and better corporate governance will reduce the relative risk of the 
experimental group of companies. On the other hand, standard deviation of stock returns   26 
represents the volatility. If appropriate and timely information is disclosed to the capital 
market, then the investors will take informed decisions and there will be reduction in 
uninformed and rumor-based trading. The informed decisions on the part of investors due 
the increased availability of relevant information will reduce the volatility of the stock 
returns. Thus we a priori, conjecture that there will be a reduction in beta and volatility of 
stock returns for the companies complying with the regulation. 
In our study we test for the following hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: The regulation will not have any impact on the risk of stocks of the 
experimental group
4 of companies.  
Alternate  to  Hypothesis  1:  The  regulation  will  reduce  the  risk  of  stocks  of  the 
experimental group of companies.  
The standard finance theories state the relationship between risk and return; lower 
the risk, lower is the return. Reduction in information asymmetry will lead to lower cost 
of capital and hence increase the valuation of the company. We surmise that the reduced 
risk in terms of beta and standard deviation will reduce the returns after the regulation has 
become effective. Our next hypothesis is  
Hypothesis 2: The regulation will not have any impact on the returns on stocks of the 
experimental group of companies.  
Alternate  to  Hypothesis  2:  The  regulation  will  reduce  the  returns  on  stocks  of  the 
experimental group of companies.  
 
4.1. Model  
4.1.1. Beta 
                                                 
4 The companies disclosing the information as required by the SEBI regulation on Corporate Governance.   27 
Beta is the first variable we study to find the impact of the SEBI regulation. Beta 
measures the systematic risk of a security with respect to the market portfolio. It is the 
ratio  of  the  covariance  of  a  stock  with  the  market  movement  to  that  of  the  market 
variance. 
 
2 / E im m β σ σ =        (1) 
Where  
E β  is the equity  beta of a stock, 
im σ  is the covariance of the stock i with the market portfolio, 
2
m σ  is the variance of the market portfolio. 
We  study  the  change  in  beta  from  the  pre-regulation  time  period to  the  post-
regulation time period for equity shares (common stocks) of the sample companies. Beta 
is  tested  using  the  market  model.  For  each  of  the  companies  we  calculate  the  beta 
separately for pre-regulation time period and the post-regulation time period using the 
following market model. 
it i i t i R Rm e α β = + +                                   (2) 
Where  
it R  = (Pt+ Dt – Pt-1) / Pt ; 
it R  is the return of a security i over for time period t; 
Pt is the price of the security at time t; 
Pt-1 is the price of the security at time t-1; 
D is the cash dividend of the security i; 
i α  is the intercept;   28 
i β  is the beta coefficient for the security i; 
Rm is the return of BSE 200
5  over the time period t; 
  i e   is the error term independent and identically distributed across time 
period t and follows a normal distribution with mean zero and constant 
variance. 
We  assume  that  weekly  returns  are  normally  distributed.  ‘Normal  probability 
plot’ presented as graphs (Fig.8 to Fig.13) support the assumption. We also find that for a 
sub-sample of the experimental group, the error terms for the regression equations have 
constant variance. Although the literature supports modified versions of Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) like the Arbitrage Pricing Model (Ross, 1976), the Consumption 
based CAPM (Breeden, 1979), dynamic CAPM (Bollerserv et al, 1988),  Conditional 
Two Factor Model (Jagannathan and Wang, 1996); our sample satisfies the assumptions 
of homoskedasticity, normality and lack of autocorrelation  and as such the market model 
is robust enough to test for the changes in the beta consequent upon the regulation.  
 
4.1.2 Volatility of stock returns  
The next proxy for risk being tested in our study is the volatility of stock returns. 
We test for the reduction in the volatility of the companies complying with the SEBI 
regulation. For each company we calculate the weekly returns according to the equation 
3, separately for the pre-regulation time period and the post-regulation time period. 
 
it R  = (Pt+ Dt – Pt-1) / Pt ;          (3) 
                                                 
5 Index comprising of 200 most liquid stocks traded on Bombay Stock Exchange.    29 
where, 
it R  is the return of a security i over for time period t; 
Pt is the price of the security at time t; 
Pt-1 is the price of the security at time t-1; 
D is the cash dividend of the security i. 
 
The hypothesis we test in this case is 
1
2
: 1 o H
σ
σ
=         (4) 
Where  1 σ is the standard deviation of weekly returns on investment in equity shares of 
companies  during  the  pre-regulation  time  period  and  2 σ   is  the  standard  deviation  of 
weekly returns on investment in equity shares of the same group of companies during the 
post-regulation time period. To test for equality of the standard deviation under  o H  in 
equation.4 is equivalent to testing for  0 uv ρ = (see appendix 1 for proof). Where  uv ρ  is 
correlation  coefficient  between  the  returns  for  pre-regulation  time  period  and  post-














￿                             (5) 
Where  uv r is the sample correlation coefficient of returns for pre-regulation time 
period and post-regulation time period.  
 
4.1.3 Returns 
The last variable we study to find the impact of the regulation is the stock returns. 
We examine whether there has been a reduction in the returns, consequently leading to a   30 
reduction in the cost of capital of the companies complying with the SEBI regulation. 
Instead of the expected returns we look at the actual returns for the purpose of our study. 
We compute the weekly stock returns on equity shares for each company according to 
equation 3, separately for pre-regulation time period and the post-regulation time period. 
Paired-t test is used to find for significant reduction in the returns of the companies. The 
detailed methodology and results of our study is given in section 5.    
 
5. Methodology and Results 
 
We use the event study method for the purpose of our research.  Event studies 
provide an ideal tool for examining the information content of disclosures (MacKinlay, 
1997). Apart from detecting the impact of disclosure, the method is widely used to find 
the impact of certain firm-specific events on the stock prices. The event study dealing 
with  firm  specific  events  like  earnings  announcements,  stock  splits,  mergers  and 
acquisition  require  a  smaller  event  window.  In  these  cases  the  exact  date  of 
announcement is known. However, for the studies dealing with regulatory impact, the 
event window will be longer and the exact event date is not known. Binder (1983, 1985b) 
examines 20 major regulatory changes that took place from 1887 to 1978, and reports 
that on an average the regulatory process takes 18.5 months to be implementable.  Beta, 
volatility and returns represent the long-term impact of the regulation on the companies 
involved  and  hence  a  pre-event  window  and  the  post-event  window  should  be  long 
enough to gauge the impact of the regulation. For regulatory studies with monthly data, 
atleast 60 monthly observations are required on each side of the event window. On the 
other hand for weekly or daily data, data for a year is customary (Lamdin, 2001).    31 
The  timeline  of  the  Kumaramangalam  Birla  Committee  formation  and  the 
implementation are given below. The time line helps us to identify the pre-regulation 
time period and post-regulation time period for our study. The pre-regulation time period 
for the purpose of our study is taken from 1
st June 1998 to 31
st May 1999.  And the post-
regulation time period is from 1
st June 2001 to 31
st May 2002. We restrict our analysis in 
the  post-regulation  time  period  to  31
st  May  2002,  since  after  this  time  period  the 
regulation became applicable to many companies that were not required to comply with 
the regulation for the financial year ended 2001.  
The  quasi-experimental  study  is  used  in  our  research.  The  quasi-experimental 
study  helps  us  to  identify  the  impact  of  the  regulation  on  the  experimental  group  of 
companies and hence will enable us to segregate the impact of other macro economic 
variables  on  the  companies.  Generally  the  quasi-experimental  study  deals  with  two 
groups; one the experimental group and the other the control group. Experimental group 
of companies are those companies for which the regulation is applicable for the financial 
year ended 2001 and the control group of companies are those companies for which the 
regulation  is  not  applicable  for  the  financial  year  ended  2001.  In  this  case,  if  the 
additional information being disclosed due to the regulation has an impact on the stock 
market  variables,  then  only  the  experimental  group  will  show  statistically  significant 
results and not the control group. In case of change of any macro economic variables or 
any political factors; this will have an impact on all the companies irrespective of those 
belonging to the control sample or the experimental sample. Hence, by using the control 
sample we can segregate the effect of the regulation and other macro economic variables. 
Prowess,  the  financial  database  maintained  by  the  Centre  for  Monitoring  the 
Indian Economy (CMIE), contains the financial information of 4,572 listed companies.   32 
Apart  from  the  Prowess  financial  database,  we  also  use  the  database  from  Sansco 
Services, which contains the annual reports of approximately 7000 companies for the 
financial years 1999 to 2001. For the purpose of our study the 4,572 companies, whose 
information is available in Prowess, are classified into three groups as mentioned below. 
The BSE Group A companies and Nifty companies, which were required to comply with 
the SEBI regulation for the financial year ended 2001, are classified as the experimental 
group. According to the regulation the companies forming part of BSE Group A and the 
Nifty as on 1
st January 2000, consists of 134 companies and these companies are the 
initial sample of the experimental group. There are companies, which were not required 
by the SEBI but still have complied with the regulation voluntarily for the financial year 
ended in 2001. Those companies are classified as quasi-experimental group. There are 
408  companies  in  the  quasi-experimental  group.  The  remaining  companies  are  our 
control  sample,  which  consists  of  4030  companies.  After  eliminating  the  companies 
whose market capitalization for financial year ended 2001 is not available in Prowess, 
those with a different financial year ending other than 31
st March, and whose market 
capitalization as on March 2001 is less than Rs. 1 crore (Rs. 10 million); the final sample 
size across the groups are 102, 331 and 3095 for experimental, quasi-experimental and 
control groups respectively.    
Before proceeding further we need to look at the distribution of each of these 
groups. By examining the frequency distribution of these groups in Table.3 we find that 
all the three groups have different means and standard deviations and hence belong to 
different  distributions.  Table.4  comprises  of  the  descriptive  statistics  of  these  groups. 
Experimental group comprises of companies with high market capitalization, with a mean 
of  Rs.  4,062.01  cr  and  standard  deviation  of  Rs.  9,800.51  cr.  These  102  companies   33 
account for 70.55 % of market capitalization of the final sample size while they barely 
account  for  2.97  %  of  the  total  number  of  the  companies.  On  examining  the  quasi-
experimental group, we find that 331 companies account for 12.21 % of the total market 
capitalization and 9.43 % of the total number of firms. The mean and standard deviation 
of the market capitalization of this group is Rs. 217.54 cr and Rs. 1140.67 cr respectively. 
The control group comprises of 3095 companies, which account for 17.27 % and 87.6 % 
of the total market capitalization and the total number of firms respectively. The mean 
and standard deviation of this group is Rs. 32.94 cr and 196.83 cr respectively. The mean, 
median  and  standard  deviation,  percentage  of  companies,  percentage  of  market 
capitalization; all are different across these three groups. Therefore, the comparison of the 
impact of the regulation across the groups is not possible. So our study is restricted to the 
comparison  of  the  stock  market  variables  from  pre-regulation  time  period  to  post-
regulation time period, separately for each these groups.  
Analysis of a random sample of these companies may not give meaningful results 
because such sample will not reflect upon the difference of impact of the regulation, if 
any, on the different sizes of the companies. We conjecture that the impact of regulation 
on these companies may vary depending upon the size of the companies. Hence each of 
the groups is further divided into 3 Sets. Set I consists of large companies with market 
capitalization of more than Rs.1500 crore; Set II consists of medium sized companies 
with market capitalization between Rs.1500 crore and Rs.100 crore; and Set III consists 
of companies with market capitalization of less than Rs.100 crore but more than Rs. 1 
crore.  This division of the three groups into three different sets will enable us to study 
the  impact  of  the  regulation  on  all  the  companies,  and  also  to  find  if  the  size  of  a 
company in terms of market capitalization does matter in our analysis. The descriptive   34 
statistics  of  these  groups,  set-wise  is  given  in  Table.5.  Since  the  size  of  quasi-
experimental group set I, control group set I and the experimental group set III are small, 
we ignore these groups for our further analysis. The companies belonging to set I and set 
II across all the groups have been traded for more than 100 days during the financial year 
ended 2002.  
To compute the beta of individual securities we used the weekly closing prices of 
the  securities  and  the  market  index  (BSE  200).  Dividend  is  adjusted  to  calculate  the 
weekly returns only if the ex-dividend date falls in that particular week. The return of the 
securities is adjusted for the stock splits, consolidation and bonus issues, if any, during 
the relevant time period. 
For each company we regress the weekly returns on the weekly BSE 200 returns, 
separately for pre-regulation time period and post-regulation time period. Each regression 
equation  is  tested  for  the  significance  of  the  F-statistic  in  order  to  confirm  that  the 
relationship between the market return and the individual company return is statistically 
significant  and  is  also  checked  for  autocorrelation  using  the  Durbin-Watson  statistic. 
Only companies with statistically significant regression relationship and with absence of 
autocorrelation  are  included  for  our  further  analysis.  Further,  the  aforementioned 
conditions should be satisfied for both the time periods.  Each security will have two 
estimates of beta coefficient; one for the pre-regulation time period and the other for the 
post-regulation time period. The beta coefficients for both pre-regulation time period and 
post-regulation time period along with the actual change for all the companies is given in 
annexure 2 at the end of the paper. Statistical results for testing the equality of beta for 
the two time periods group-wise and set-wise are reported in Table.6.    35 
We  need  to  analyze  the  proportion  of  the  companies  for  which  the  beta  has 
increased  /  decreased  to  understand  the  direction  of  change  of  the  beta  for  different 
groups  across  different  sets.  Table.7.  reports  the  direction  of  change  in  beta  for 
companies across different groups and different sets.  
As expected the experimental group belonging to both set I and set II experienced 
a change in beta (a reduction in beta). The t-statistic is significant at 5% level. 72.97% 
and  71.43%  of  the  experimental  group  of  companies  belonging  to  set  I  and  set  II, 
respectively have experienced a reduction in beta We can say that the regulation has 
reduced the beta of the companies belonging to the experimental groups. However, for 
the quasi-experimental group and control group belonging to set II we find that the t-
statistic is not significantly different from zero. Though the quasi-experimental group has 
complied with the regulation voluntarily, we find that there is no change in beta. It might 
be that the market does not consider the disclosure by these companies to be credible as 
the Corporate Governance Report of such companies is not subject to audit. On the other 
hand as there is no additional information being given by the control group belonging to 
set  II,  the  t-statistic  for  this  group  is  not  statistically  significant  proving  that  lack  of 
disclosure has no impact on beta.  
The third set was obtained by taking 2 stratified samples of 30 companies each, 
separately for both quasi-experimental group and the control group. Stratified sampling is 
done so that companies of all sizes in that group are included in our analysis. The results 
for the quasi-experimental group and control group belonging to the third set shows that 
there are only two companies in each of the group for which the regression equation is 
statistically significant and there is no autocorrelation. These companies have a market 
capitalization  of  less  than  Rs.  100  cr,  and  are  less  liquid.  The  illiquidity  of  these   36 
companies might have resulted in the lack of significant regression equations and hence 
further analysis of the companies belonging to this set is not feasible.  
The results obtained for the beta prove that the regulation has had an influence on 
the perception of the investors and hence it has been captured by the changes in the beta 
of the companies belonging to experimental groups. We obtain similar results when we 
use daily stock returns instead of the weekly returns to calculate beta. 
The  results  on  volatility  and  returns  are  reported  in  Table.8  and  Table.9 
respectively.  For  meaningful  comparison    we  consider  only  companies  which  were 
included in the analysis of change in beta. From Table.8 we find that the volatility for the 
experimental group belonging to set I experienced a significant reduction during the post-
regulation time period.  Similarly,  for the quasi-experimental group  and control group 
belonging set II there has been significant reduction in the volatility subsequent to the 
regulation  being  effective.  We  find  that  the  volatility  of  all  the  groups  including  the 
control group has significantly reduced during the post-regulation time period. Therefore, 
we  cannot  conclude  about  the  impact  of  the  regulation  on  the  volatility  of  the  stock 
returns. It appears that volatility across all the companies are reduced during the post-
regulation period due to factors other than the Regulation. It is difficult to isolate the 
impact of regulation from other economic variables that could have reduced the volatility 
in the stock markets. It is unwise to draw any definitive conclusions from the results 
(relating to returns) obtained from our study. 
The  results  for  returns  are  given  in  table.9.  below.  We  find  that  for  the 
experimental group belonging to set I there has been a statistically significant reduction 
in  the  returns  during  the  post-regulation  time  period,  supporting  our  hypothesis  2. 
However for the groups belonging to set II, except for experimental group set II, we do   37 
not find any significant changes in the returns during the post-regulation time period. We 
find  that  the  experimental  group  of  companies  belonging  to  set  II  there  has  been  an 
increase in the returns contrary to our hypothesis. This result may be due to the firm 




The  SEBI  regulation  on  corporate  governance  gives  an  unique  opportunity  to 
study  the  economic  impact  of  the  regulation  in  India,  one  of  the  biggest  emerging 
markets. Our results show that there has been significant reduction in the beta of the 
experimental group of companies. Although, the results on volatility and  actual returns 
do  not  lead  to  any  conclusion,  the  beta  captures  the  market  risk  and  is  important  in 
analysing the impact of the regulation. Reduction in beta indicates that the market risk of 
these securities has reduced thereby reducing the expected returns and consequently the 
expected cost of capital of such companies.  Largely, from beta results, we can conclude 
that the Regulation has been effective in providing more and timely information to the 
investors, who in turn could use the information to determine the appropriate risks of the 
stocks;  thereby  maximizing  the  shareholders  wealth.  Results  regarding  return  and 
variance do not undermine the evidence, ,provided by results relating to beta, that the 
Regulation reduces the systematic risk of securities and consequently the cost of capital 
to firms. Cost of capital is a function of expected return. Actual returns may deviate from 
expected  returns.  In  an  environment  where  companies  have  no  impetus  to  disclose 
information voluntarily, regulations requiring enhanced disclosure protect the investors’ 
interest in general. There are certain limitations of our study; the results across the sets   38 
might vary depending upon the criteria one considers to segregate the sets into different 
groups. An extension of our study can be done by looking at the impact of this regulation 
on the stock market efficiency, and also understanding the implications of this regulation 







































The returns for the pre-regulation period and post-regulation period follow a bivariate 
normal distribution as given in Equation (a) below. 
 
*
2 1 2 1 2 ( , ) ( , , , , ) i i R R N µ µ σ σ ρ ￿         (Eq. a) 
 
    Where  i R  is the weekly returns for the pre-regulation time period, 
   
*









 = +  = 
= −  
 
Where n is the number of companies belonging to that group. 
 
* * ( , ) ( , ) i i i i Cov u v Cov R R R R = + −  
      
* ( ) ( ) i i Var R Var R = −  
      
2 2
1 2 0, σ σ = − =  as under  o H  
0 uv ρ ⇒ = .  
 
Therefore,  the  testing  of  uv ρ =  0  is  equivalent  to  testing  for  equality  of  the  standard 
deviation of the returns. 
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Appendix 2 
 
Table. a. Experimental Group - Set 1 
Pre-regulation  Post-Regulation 
Companies 
R-
square  Beta 
R-
square  Beta 
Difference  
in beta 
Associated Cement Cos. Ltd.  0.598  1.484  0.466  1.21  0.274 
Bajaj Auto Ltd.  0.458  0.958  0.182  0.533  0.425 
Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd.  0.679  1.654  0.439  1.148  0.506 
Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd.  0.19  0.873  0.33  1.241  -0.368 
Britannia Industries Ltd.  0.287  0.744  0.222  0.368  0.376 
Cipla Ltd.  0.25  0.824  0.103  0.404  0.42 
Colgate-Palmolive (India) Ltd.  0.483  0.929  0.173  0.248  0.681 
Cummins India Ltd.  0.217  0.71  0.11  0.497  0.213 
Dabur India Ltd.  0.26  0.841  0.089  0.325  0.516 
Dr. Reddy'S Laboratories Ltd.  0.429  1.347  0.081  0.405  0.942 
Grasim Industries Ltd.  0.429  1.573  0.408  0.775  0.798 
Gujarat Ambuja Cements Ltd.  0.498  1.018  0.34  0.726  0.292 
H D F C Bank Ltd.  0.484  1.217  0.153  0.399  0.818 
Hero Honda Motors Ltd.  0.222  0.988  0.101  0.454  0.534 
Himachal Futuristic Communications Ltd.  0.462  2.169  0.415  2.716  -0.547 
Hindalco Industries Ltd.  0.1  0.48  0.141  0.491  -0.011 
Hindustan Lever Ltd.  0.385  0.679  0.271  0.619  0.06 
Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd.  0.141  0.791  0.276  1.24  -0.449 
Housing Development Finance Corpn. Ltd.  0.53  0.894  0.057  0.215  0.679 
I C I C I Ltd. [Merged]  0.485  1.422  0.151  0.692  0.73 
I T C Ltd.  0.633  1.074  0.119  0.401  0.673 
Industrial Development Bank Of India  0.508  1.189  0.12  0.593  0.596 
Infosys Technologies Ltd.  0.125  0.876  0.449  1.527  -0.651 
Larsen & Toubro Ltd.  0.834  1.758  0.393  1.154  0.604 
Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd.  0.631  1.268  0.298  0.972  0.296 
Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd.  0.327  1.002  0.309  1.323  -0.321 
Novartis India Ltd.  0.186  0.673  0.124  0.533  0.14 
Pentamedia Graphics Ltd.  0.51  2.07  0.295  2.248  -0.178 
Reliance Energy Ltd.  0.412  1.038  0.223  0.503  0.535 
Reliance Industries Ltd.  0.621  1.306  0.551  1.299  0.007 
Satyam Computer Services Ltd.  0.542  1.946  0.646  2.193  -0.247 
State Bank Of India  0.731  1.859  0.401  1.138  0.721 
Sun Pharmaceutical Inds. Ltd.  0.241  1.019  0.089  0.367  0.652 
Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd.  0.483  1.309  0.286  0.871  0.438 
Tata Motors Ltd.  0.592  1.794  0.169  0.682  1.112 
Wipro Ltd.  0.235  1.096  0.606  2.014  -0.918 
Zee Telefilms Ltd.  0.284  1.311  0.24  1.47  -0.159 
N  37         
t-statistic for the difference in beta  3.463         
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Table. b. Experimental Group - Set II 
Pre-regulation  Post-Regulation 
Companies 
R -
Square  Beta 
R -
Square  Beta 
Difference 
in beta 
Abott  0.387  0.838  0.127  0.366  0.472 
Amara Raja Batteries Ltd.  0.27  1.085  0.198  0.758  0.327 
Apollo Tyres Ltd.  0.426  1.43  0.148  0.891  0.539 
Arvind Mills Ltd.  0.261  0.972  0.205  1.016  -0.044 
Ashok Leyland Ltd.  0.178  1.054  0.141  0.728  0.326 
B P L Ltd.  0.244  1.504  0.266  1.121  0.383 
Bank Of Baroda  0.64  1.76  0.258  0.743  1.017 
Bank Of India  0.549  1.265  0.107  0.589  0.676 
BASF ltd  0.212  0.766  0.194  0.605  0.161 
Bharat Forge Ltd.  0.288  1.044  0.25  1.289  -0.245 
Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd.  0.169  0.667  0.1  0.402  0.265 
Carrier Aircon Ltd.  0.554  1.284  0.069  0.236  1.048 
Century Enka Ltd.  0.164  0.781  0.068  0.56  0.221 
Chennai Petroleum Corpn. Ltd.  0.194  0.732  0.249  0.86  -0.128 
Corporation Bank  0.596  1.905  0.17  0.785  1.12 
Crisil Ltd.  0.277  0.749  0.14  0.981  -0.232 
Crompton Greaves Ltd.  0.31  1.374  0.073  0.752  0.622 
Escorts Ltd.  0.432  0.922  0.172  0.73  0.192 
Essel Propack Ltd.  0.253  0.879  0.158  0.746  0.133 
Exide Industries Ltd.  0.255  0.938  0.129  0.49  0.448 
Finolex Cables Ltd.  0.331  1.15  0.295  0.644  0.506 
Great Eastern Shipping Co. Ltd.  0.292  0.942  0.231  0.658  0.284 
Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers Co. Ltd.  0.189  0.657  0.198  0.635  0.022 
I C I India Ltd.  0.346  1.03  0.317  0.799  0.231 
India Cements Ltd.  0.257  0.978  0.314  1.014  -0.036 
Indian Hotels Co. Ltd.  0.282  0.677  0.376  1.008  -0.331 
Indian Petrochemicals Corpn. Ltd.  0.271  1.118  0.466  1.403  -0.285 
Indo Gulf Corpn. Ltd. [Merged]  0.159  0.766  0.286  1.044  -0.278 
Ingersoll-Rand (India) Ltd.  0.291  0.8  0.196  0.898  -0.098 
Kesoram Industries Ltd.  0.381  1.506  0.296  0.658  0.848 
Kochi Refineries Ltd.  0.2  0.807  0.15  0.783  0.024 
L I C Housing Finance Ltd.  0.427  1.277  0.246  0.707  0.57 
M R F Ltd.  0.333  1.17  0.105  0.612  0.558 
Madras Cements Ltd.  0.416  0.947  0.275  0.43  0.517 
Micro Inks Ltd.  0.077  0.728  0.206  0.613  0.115 
Nicholas Piramal India Ltd.  0.356  0.746  0.366  0.571  0.175 
Oriental Bank Of Commerce  0.546  1.352  0.284  0.581  0.771 
Punjab Tractors Ltd.  0.166  0.605  0.207  0.529  0.076 
Ray Ban Sun Optics India Ltd.  0.291  1.468  0.098  1.038  0.43 
Raymond Ltd.  0.253  1.352  0.086  0.422  0.93 
Reliance Capital Ltd.  0.527  1.094  0.608  1.481  -0.387 
T V S Motor Co. Ltd.  0.227  0.558  0.1  0.76  -0.202 
Tata Chemicals Ltd.  0.417  1.194  0.19  0.603  0.591 
Tata Elxsi Ltd.  0.237  0.651  0.248  0.717  -0.066 
Tata Power Co. Ltd.  0.288  1.682  0.472  1.923  -0.241 
Tata Tea Ltd.  0.51  1.2  0.414  0.891  0.309 
Thermax Ltd.  0.385  1.297  0.359  1.348  -0.051   42 
Titan Industries Ltd.  0.307  1.108  0.207  0.965  0.143 
Videocon International Ltd.  0.346  1.813  0.334  1.124  0.689 
N  49         
t-statistic for the difference in beta  4.802         
Significance  0.00*         
 
 
Table. c. Quasi-Experimental Group – Set II 
Pre-regulation  Post-Regulation 
Companies 
R-
Square  Beta 
R- 
Square  Beta 
Difference 
in beta 
           
Ambuja Cement Eastern Ltd.  0.109  0.677  0.126  0.663  0.014 
C E S C Ltd.  0.161  0.694  0.13  1.008  -0.314 
C M C Ltd.  0.24  1.835  0.185  1.355  0.48 
Clariant (India) Ltd.  0.324  1.092  0.192  0.612  0.48 
Colour-Chem Ltd.  0.111  0.569  0.192  1.178  -0.609 
Cybertech Systems & Software Ltd.  0.244  1.305  0.076  1.896  -0.591 
Electrosteel Castings Ltd.  0.315  0.955  0.165  0.883  0.072 
E-Serve International Ltd.  0.134  1.312  0.349  1.614  -0.302 
Federal Bank Ltd.  0.412  1.063  0.164  1.159  -0.096 
Hinduja T M T Ltd.  0.139  0.723  0.309  2.021  -1.298 
Hotel Leelaventure Ltd.  0.426  0.981  0.162  0.604  0.377 
I B P Co. Ltd.  0.199  0.829  0.267  1.434  -0.605 
I F C I Ltd.  0.181  0.538  0.153  1.379  -0.841 
I T I Ltd.  0.162  1.217  0.162  1.918  -0.701 
Indusind Bank Ltd.  0.205  0.968  0.182  0.663  0.305 
Insilco Ltd.  0.089  1.051  0.195  0.914  0.137 
Ipca Laboratories Ltd.  0.598  1.938  0.188  0.937  1.001 
J B Chemicals  0.194  1.04  0.131  0.683  0.357 
K S B Pumps Ltd.  0.112  0.389  0.153  0.822  -0.433 
Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd.  0.219  0.831  0.084  0.925  -0.094 
lakshmi  0.126  0.809  0.088  0.593  0.216 
Mirc Electronics Ltd.  0.159  0.987  0.135  1.382  -0.395 
Moser Baer India Ltd.  0.182  1.491  0.376  0.962  0.529 
Mphasis B F L Ltd.  0.335  1.311  0.093  1.318  -0.007 
Orchid Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals Ltd.  0.356  1.229  0.35  0.935  0.294 
Oriental Hotels Ltd.  0.224  0.5  0.094  0.486  0.014 
Parke-Davis (India) Ltd. [Merged]  0.345  1.172  0.173  0.565  0.607 
Prism Cement Ltd.  0.14  0.792  0.215  0.948  -0.156 
R S Software (India) Ltd.  0.331  1.657  0.3  2.11  -0.453 
Rolta India Ltd.  0.455  2.106  0.324  1.878  0.228 
Samtel Color Ltd.  0.134  0.944  0.123  1  -0.056 
Unichem Laboratories Ltd.  0.285  1.28  0.098  0.481  0.799 
Uniphos Enterprises Ltd.  0.422  1.444  0.163  0.959  0.485 
United Western Bank Ltd.  0.139  0.673  0.084  0.557  0.116 
Zandu pharma  0.131  0.617  0.081  0.282  0.335 
N  35         
t-statistic for the difference in beta  -0.036         
Significance  0.972         
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Table. d. Control Group – Set II 
Pre-regulation  Post-Regulation 
Companies  R-Square  Beta 
R-
Square  Beta 
Difference 
in beta 
Archies Ltd.  0.28  0.992  0.116  1.37  -0.378 
Atcom Technologies Ltd.  0.104  0.788  0.216  1.593  -0.805 
Aurobindo Pharma Ltd.  0.133  0.992  0.316  0.96  0.032 
Avaya Globalconnect Ltd.  0.106  0.881  0.27  1.401  -0.52 
B O C India Ltd.  0.315  1.14  0.161  1.122  0.018 
B S E L Infrastructure Realty Ltd.  0.272  1.75  0.083  1.097  0.653 
Balrampur Chini Mills Ltd.  0.199  0.784  0.1  0.469  0.315 
Bank Of Punjab Ltd.  0.233  0.571  0.127  0.411  0.16 
Bank Of Rajasthan Ltd.  0.12  0.691  0.088  0.591  0.1 
Bharat Electronics Ltd.  0.291  1.511  0.216  1.191  0.32 
Binani Industries Ltd.  0.254  0.86  0.233  0.698  0.162 
Birla Ericsson Optical Ltd.  0.199  0.991  0.348  1.109  -0.118 
Blue Dart Express Ltd.  0.103  0.887  0.088  0.684  0.203 
Ceat Ltd.  0.451  1.147  0.159  0.899  0.248 
Century Textiles & Inds. Ltd.  0.296  1.538  0.46  1.347  0.191 
Container Corpn. Of India Ltd.  0.085  0.472  0.257  0.891  -0.419 
Crest Communication Ltd.  0.212  1.517  0.413  1.781  -0.264 
Dena Bank  0.222  0.659  0.117  0.876  -0.217 
F D C Ltd.  0.199  0.856  0.08  0.536  0.32 
Godfrey Phillips India Ltd.  0.115  0.793  0.093  0.454  0.339 
Godrej Industries Ltd.  0.285  1.456  0.134  0.521  0.935 
Goodlass Nerolac Paints Ltd.  0.308  0.737  0.174  0.75  -0.013 
Gujarat Gas Co. Ltd.  0.433  1.468  0.161  0.468  1 
Gujarat Industries Power Co. Ltd.  0.12  0.591  0.381  1.441  -0.85 
Gujarat Mineral Devp. Corpn. Ltd.  0.309  1.332  0.243  1.183  0.149 
Gujarat State Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd.  0.125  0.607  0.159  1.107  -0.5 
Himatsingka Seide Ltd.  0.332  1.145  0.206  0.654  0.491 
Hindustan Zinc Ltd.  0.117  0.998  0.222  0.964  0.034 
I T C Hotels Ltd.  0.211  0.857  0.195  0.673  0.184 
Infomedia India Ltd.  0.177  0.683  0.104  0.784  -0.101 
Infotech Enterprises Ltd.  0.162  1.49  0.183  1.396  0.094 
Jammu & Kashmir Bank Ltd.  0.23  0.877  0.128  0.757  0.12 
Jindal Photo Ltd.  0.24  0.95  0.308  1.047  -0.097 
Jindal Strips Ltd.  0.262  0.775  0.198  0.797  -0.022 
Monsanto India Ltd.  0.274  1.207  0.144  0.71  0.497 
Orient Information Technology Ltd.  0.399  1.995  0.201  1.797  0.198 
Parekh Platinum Ltd.  0.116  0.827  0.11  1.163  -0.336 
Punjab Communications Ltd.  0.142  0.952  0.268  1.413  -0.461 
Rama Newsprint & Papers Ltd.  0.148  1.082  0.117  0.729  0.353 
Saw Pipes Ltd.  0.187  0.83  0.209  1.876  -1.046 
Shaw Wallace & Co. Ltd.  0.138  0.871  0.204  1.272  -0.401 
Shipping Corpn. Of India Ltd.  0.078  0.612  0.24  1.31  -0.698 
State Bank Of Bikaner & Jaipur  0.26  0.675  0.137  0.382  0.293 
Tamil Nadu Newsprint & Papers Ltd.  0.192  1.361  0.146  0.849  0.512 
Tamilnadu Petroproducts Ltd.  0.173  0.661  0.229  0.528  0.133 
Timken India Ltd.  0.304  1.188  0.125  0.689  0.499   44 
TRYGIN  0.268  1.37  0.18  1.915  -0.545 
U T I Bank Ltd.  0.301  0.67  0.314  0.977  -0.307 
Usha Martin Ltd.  0.271  0.917  0.207  0.944  -0.027 
Vashisti Detergents Ltd.  0.22  0.639  0.171  0.911  -0.272 
Wyeth Ltd.  0.123  0.598  0.2  0.699  -0.101 
N  50         
t-statistic for the difference in beta  0.018         
Significance  0.986         
 
 
Table. e. Quasi-Experimental Group – Set III 
Pre-regulation  Post-Regulation 
Companies  R-Square  Beta 
R-
Square  Beta 
Difference 
in beta 
           
Nucleus Software Exports Ltd.  0.363  2.136  0.241  1.676  0.46 
South Indian Bank Ltd.  0.201  0.86  0.106  0.937  -0.077 
 
 
Table. f. Control Group – Set III 
Pre-regulation  Post-Regulation 
Companies  R-Square  Beta 
R-
Square  Beta 
Difference 
in beta 
           
Alkyl Amines Chemicals Ltd.  0.223  1.215  0.1  1.204  0.011 
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Tables Forming Part of Manuscript 
 
 
Table.1. Summary of empirical research in financial disclosure regulation 
 
Researcher  Regulation  Result 
Stigler (1964)  SEC Act 1934  New issues post-SEC has lower volatility 
and also lower returns. 
Benston (1973)  SEC Act 1934  No  reduction  in  standard  deviation  and 
beta. 
Friend and Herman (1964)  SEC Act 1934  Lower  volatility  during  the  post-SEC 
period  has  attracted  more  risk-averse 
investors,  leading  to  higher  levels  of 
investments in U.S Capital Markets. 
Friend and Westerfield (1975)  SEC Act 1934  Proved  that  wrong  classification  by 
Benston (1973) led to the wrong result. 
Jarell (1981)  SEC Act 1934  Confirms the result of Stigler (1964) with 
better techniques. 
Collins (1975)  Segment 
Reporting 1970 
Portfolio  comprising  of  companies  with 
more segmented information earned higher 
abnormal  returns  than  the  portfolio  with 
less segmented information. 
Dhaliwal (1977)  Segment 
Reporting 1970 
The  companies  disclosing  segment 
reporting information have lower standard 
deviation. 
Horwitz and Kolodny (1977)  Segment 
Reporting 1970 
Segment reporting does not reduce the beta 
of such companies. 
Collins and Simons (1978)  Segment 
Reporting 1970 
Prove that Horwitz and Kolodny’s results 
are wrong due to wrong sample selection.  
Foster and Vickery (1978)  Segment 
Reporting 1970 
Companies  with  more  segmental 
information  have  earned  higher  abnormal 
returns  after  the  regulation  has  become 
effective. 
Swaminathan (1991)  Segment 
Reporting 1970 
Consequent upon the regulation, the price 
variability  has  increased;  and  there  is 
reduction  in  the  forecast  error  by  the 
analysts. 
Greenstein and Sami (1994)  Segment 
Reporting 1970 
Segment  disclosures  reduced  the  bid-ask 
spread.  
Hagerman (1975)  Federal Reserve 
Board Directive, 
1963 
Financial  Statements  of  State  Banks 
contains  information  upon  which  the 
investors  have  acted  and  this  has  been 
reflected in stock price movements 
Lev (1979)  Oil and natural 
gas Regulation, 
1977 
Reduction  in  abnormal  returns  by 
companies required to shift form full cost 
group to successful efforts group. 
Jain (1983)  Oil and natural 
gas Regulation, 
Confirms  the  results  obtained  by  Lev 
(1979).   54 
1977 
Hagerman and Healy (2000)  OTC companies 
required to 
disclose as per the 
SEC Act, 1934 
No reduction in the bid-ask spread for OTC 
firms after regulation has come into effect. 
Regulation was not effective. 
Bushee and Luez (2003)  OTC companies 
required to 
disclose as per the 
SEC Act, 1933 
Liquidity  has  increased  for  experimental 
group.  
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000)    International 
Accounting 
Standards 
Increase  in  liquidity  and  reduction  in  the 
bid-ask  spread  after  the  German  firms 




Table.2. Sample size of the groups 
 






Companies for which disclosure is required  134  Nil  Nil 
Initial sample size  134  408  4030 
No information on market capitalization for FY 01  2  18  318 
Different financial year ending  27  57  159 
Companies with market capitalization less than 1 cr   3  2  458 




Table.3 Frequency Distribution Based on Market Capitalization 
 






Above 50000  1  0  0 
25000-50000  3  0  0 
10000-25000  6  1  0 
5000-10000  6  1  1 
1000-5000  34  7  10 
500-1000  17  9  18 
100-500  32  91  134 
50-100  3  45  130 
10 – 50  0  107  628 
1 to 10  0  70  2174 
Less than 1  3  2  458 
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Table.4 Descriptive Statistics of companies belonging to final sample  
 






Total market capitalization  418386.65  72439.17  102219.35 
% of market capitalization  70.55  12.21  17.24 
No. of companies  102  331  3095 
% Of total companies  2.97  9.43  87.60 
Average market capitalization  4062.01  217.54  32.94 
Standard deviation market capitalization  9800.51  1140.67  196.83 
Median market capitalization  920.88  36.48  4.59 
 
 
Table.5. Division of groups into sets based on the Market Capitalization 
 






Set I – Market Capitalization of more than Rs.1,500 cr 
Total market capitalization  386694.22  36025.80  28431.08 
No. of companies  42  5  9 
Average market capitalization  9207.01  7205.16  3159.01 
% Of market capitalization of that group  92.43  49.73  27.81 
% Market capitalization of all companies  65.20  6.07  4.79 
Set II – Market Capitalization between 100 crore to 1500 crore 
Total market capitalization   31414.90  29865.87  42836.62 
No. of companies  57  103  154 
Average Market capitalization  551.14  289.96  278.16 
% Of market capitalization of that group  7.51  41.23  41.91 
% Market capitalization of all companies  5.30  5.04  7.22 
Set III – Market capitalization of less than 100 crore  
Total market capitalization  276.60  4726.48  41862.32 
No. of companies  3  223  2942 
Average market capitalization  92.20  22.83  13.90 
% Of market capitalization of that group  0.07  6.52  40.95 
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in beta  
(b0- bo') 
Sig. of      
t-Statistic 
Set I             
Experimental Group              
           Mean  1.194  0.919  0.275  37  3.463  0.01
* 
           Standard Deviation   0.424  0.615  0.484       
Set II             
Experimental Group              
           Mean  1.074  0.806  0.268  49  4.802  0.000
* 
           Standard Deviation   0.336  0.315  0.390       
Quasi-Experimental Group             
           Mean  1.058  1.061  -0.003  35  -0.036  0.972 
           Standard Deviation   0.412  0.485  0.498       
Control Group             
           Mean  0.985  0.984  0.001  50  0.018  0.986 
           Standard Deviation   0.342  0.398  0.428       
* Represents significance at 5% level 
The number of cases statistically significant for each of Quasi-Experimental Group and Control 




Table.7. Direction of change in beta 
 
   N  Reduction 
in Beta (%) 
Increase in 
Beta(%) 
Set I       
   Experimental Group  37  72.97  27.03 
Set II       
   Experimental Group  45  71.43  28.57 
   Quasi- Experimental Group  48  54.29  45.71 
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Set I             
Experimental Group              
           Mean  0.446  0.046  0.401  37  2.143
*  1.690 
           Standard Deviation   0.951  0.621  1.137       
Set II             
Experimental Group              
           Mean  -0.034  0.462  -0.497  49  -2.547  1.677 
           Standard Deviation   1.003  0.841  1.365       
Quasi-Experimental Group             
           Mean  0.473  0.968  -0.495  35  -1.175  1.690 
           Standard Deviation   1.491  1.095  1.707       
Control Group             
           Mean  0.301  0.508  -0.236  51  -1.003  1.676 
           Standard Deviation   1.380  0.928  1.677       
* Represents significance at 5% level 
The number of cases statistically significant for each of Quasi-Experimental Group and Control 













Set 1         
Experimental Group   0.392  37  2.741*  1.690 
Set 2         
Experimental Group   0.293  49  1.214  1.677 
Quasi- Experimental Group  0.278  35  1.731*  1.690 
Control Group  0.370  51  3.00*  1.676 
* Represents significance at 5% level 
The number of cases statistically significant for each of Quasi-Experimental Group 
and Control Group in Set III is 2 and hence cannot be tested for change in Volatility.   58 
 
Table.10. The average number of transactions of 100 sample companies which have 
been traded on a particular day for a particular month 
 
Year  Jan  Feb  March  April  May  June  July  August  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec 
1997  12.21  10.31  7.11  13.76  12.78  6.24  15.36  14.65  9.23  8.53  14.71  17.33 
1998  11.97  22.60  45.17  45.97  72.34  68.33  37.77  40.94  75.35  100.56  77.07  133.37 
1999  96.37  71.34  75.91  66.22  69.80  155.09  148.39  161.51  185.95  177.61  189.29  135.51 
2000  153.49  232.55  248.37  134.57  178.25  266.70  212.93  271.95  350.95  351.96  276.94  265.80 
2001  350.29  376.25  224.23  518.55  257.67  263.86  107.29  178.20  135.50  110.87  274.07  433.25 
2002  359.30  286.62  239.41  447.90  344.88  314.79  549.98  335.96  244.47  317.15  463.65  314.18 
 
 



































1995-96  7 
1996-97  26 
1997-98  38 
1998-99  55 
1999-00  98 
2000-01  168 
2001-02  175 
2002-03  240 
2003-04  379   59 
Figures Forming Part of Manuscript 
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Fig. 3. Internal Sources as a Percentage of Total Sources for the years 1991 – 2004 
for different business groups 
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Fig. 4. Retained Profit as a Percentage of Total Sources for the years 1991 – 2004 for 
different business groups 























































Fig. 5. Funds Raised From Capital Market by different business groups for the 
years 1991 – 2004    62 
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Fig. 6. Fresh Capital Raised From Capital Market by different business groups for 
the years 1991 – 2004  
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Fig.9. Normal probability plot of BSE 200 weekly returns for the post-regulation 
time period 
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Fig.10. Normal Probability Plot of average weekly returns of experimental group – 




Fig.11.Normal probability plot of average weekly returns of experimental group – 
Set I for the post-regulation time period 
 
 
Fig.12. Normal probability plot of average weekly returns of experimental group -




   65 
Fig.13. Normal probability plot of average weekly returns of experimental group – 
Set II for the post-regulation time period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 